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ABSTRACT
The literature exploring other-regarding behavior uncovers interesting phenomena, yet the extent
the data subscribes to foundational assumptions of economics is not well understood. We explain
how recent work challenges rational choice theory as well as its special case, convex preference
theory. We propose a new axiom that modifies classic choice theory and exhibits choice
monotonicity to observable reference points, establishing consistency with otherwise-anomalous
data. We design experiments that provide a direct test of the new axiom. Data from our
experiments and previous dictator experiments support the new axiom. We also apply the new
axiom to several sequential strategic games.

JEL Classifications: C93, D03, D64
Keywords: rational choice, moral reference points, giving, taking, experiment
* We thank the John Templeton Foundation under the Science of Philanthropy Initiative and the National
Science Foundation (grant number SES-1658743) for research funding. We thank Yongsheng Xu for
helpful comments and suggestions.

2
1. INTRODUCTION
One of the most influential bodies of economics research in the past two decades revolves
around whether and to what extent people value fairness, equity, efficiency, and reciprocity.
Experimental work has provided evidence that such motivations can be important in creating and
determining surplus allocations in markets (see, e.g., Fehr et al., 1993; Bandiera et al., 2005;
Landry et al., 2010; Cabrales et al., 2010; Herz and Taubinsky, 2017), with accompanying
theoretical models of social preferences providing a framework to rationalize such behaviors
(see, e.g., Rabin, 1993; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Cox, Friedman and
Sadiraj, 2008; Fudenberg and Levine, 2012; Celen et al., 2017; Galperti and Strulovici, 2017).
Within this line of research, pro-social preferences have been elicited using a class of
experiments taking the form of dictator games, gift exchange games, public goods games,
ultimatum games, and trust games. While such games have shown that social preferences touch
many areas of economic interactions, the literature provides little guidance as to whether
individual choices in such settings satisfy deeply held economic tenets. 1 The shortage of work
exploring basic tenets in the sharing literature contrasts sharply with other areas of behavioral
economics, which have lent deep insights into foundational assumptions within economics. For
example, for riskless choice, received results reveal that many consumers have preferences
defined over changes in consumption, but individual behavior converges to the neoclassical
prediction as trading experience intensifies (see, e.g., Kahneman et al., 1990; List, 2004;
Engelmann and Hollard, 2010).
Relatedly, for choice that involves risk, several scholars (see, e.g., Harless, 1992; Hey
and Orme, 1994) present econometric estimates of indifference curves under risk at the
individual level that show neither expected utility theory nor the non-expected utility alternatives
do a satisfactory job of organizing behavior. Choi et al. (2007) extend this analysis by
developing an experimental protocol that allows the researcher to both test the consistency of
choices with the assumption of utility maximization and estimate a two-parameter utility

1

There is some evidence that certain sharing behaviors are consonant with existing theory. For instance, in a
seminal study, Andreoni and Miller (2002) show that in a modified dictator game subjects’ choices satisfy the key
axiom of revealed preference theory. Fisman et al. (2007) extend Andreoni and Miller (2002) by developing an
experimental framework that allows the researcher to not only test the consistency of choices but also recover
individual level preferences for giving. Fisman et al. (2015) explore how preferences for giving are impacted by
macroeconomic shocks. More recently, Andersen et al. (2011) provide data that reveals demand curves for fairness
in an ultimatum game are downward sloping.
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function for each individual. These examples are not exhaustive, as there are many other active
research inquiries in this spirit, including those exploring intertemporal choice (see, e.g.,
Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999, 2001; Frederick et al., 2002), asymmetry and
transitivity of preferences (Tversky, 1969; Slovic 1995; Cox and Grether, 1996; List, 2002), and
conditional altruism (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj, 2008).
Our study follows the spirit of this broader work by exploring whether basic economic
tenets are satisfied in sharing choices as observed in the economics literature. To understand
more deeply the factors that motivate sharing, a number of scholars have augmented the standard
dictator game by varying the feasible action set (e.g., List, 2007; Bardsley, 2008; Cappelen et al.,
2013; Korenok et al., 2014). These studies report that dictators change their allocations in
interesting ways when presented a chance to take as well as to give to others. For example, in the
typical dictator game the experiment is framed such that “giving nothing” is the least generous
act, and substantial sums of money are given away (Engel, 2011). Yet, research shows that if
subjects are allowed to give or take money from the other player, they give much less to the
other player on average.2
The first goal of our study is to step back from the burgeoning literature and attempt to
synthesize what we have learned from the experimental exercises of List (2007) and others. We
explain that the traditional dictator game, wherein more than 60 percent of dictators pass a
positive amount of money, does not challenge neoclassical convex preference theory (Hicks,
1946; Samuelson, 1947). Yet, more recent results from this literature (e.g., List, 2007; Bardsley,
2008; Cappelen et al., 2013) provide evidence that challenges convex preference theory. 3 Yet,
convexity of preferences is not required by rationality, which for singleton choice sets, is
equivalent to the Contraction Consistency Axiom (Sen, 1971). 4
Building upon this discussion, we advance a new choice axiom of moral monotonicity
that is consistent with otherwise-anomalous data from prior experiments. Our theoretical
development follows the approach in Cox and Sadiraj (2010) to extend choice theory to
2

This sentiment is well reflected by Zhang and Ortmann (2014) who report results from a meta-analysis of dictator
games that allow a taking option and find, “…an economically and statistically significant negative effect on
giving…”
3
See also experiments by Grossman and Eckel, 2015; Engel, 2011; Korenok et al., 2013; Korenok et al., 2014;
Zhang and Ortmann, 2014.
4
For singleton choice sets, the Contraction Consistency Axiom states that if x is chosen from feasible set F then it
will also be chosen from any contraction (i.e., subset) of F that contains x. For set-valued choice functions,
rationality is equivalent to Sen’s (1971) Properties α and β (see below), where Property α is the Contraction
Consistency Axiom. The interested reader should see data from one of the treatments in Korenok, et al. (2014), who
provide tests of the Contraction Consistency Axiom.
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accommodate dictator game data that violates a central tenet of conventional theory – in this
case, the Contraction Consistency Axiom. A key component of our theory is the identification of
moral reference points that are a priori observable features of feasible sets and initial
endowments.5
We then report on two experiments designed to test directly the new “moral” choice
axiom – monotonicity in choice with respect to the dimensions that define moral reference
points. Results from our experiment provide support for the new axiom that captures the
observed patterns of sharing. In contrast, the data are at odds with the standard model of rational
choice and with familiar models of preferences (referred to herein as “convex preferences”). We
view our study as fitting in nicely with the “theory speaking to experiment and experiment
speaking to theory” research culture that has permeated experimental economics for decades.
The remainder of our study is structured as follows. Section 2 explores the implications
for choice in distinct types of dictator games in the previous literature that challenge: (a) homo
economicus preferences; (b) other-regarding convex preferences; and (c) general consequentialist
rational choice theory. Section 3 introduces the new axiom of moral monotonicity choice and
Section 4 presents the design of our experiments that discriminate between the new theory and
traditional theory. Section 5 presents our experimental results. Section 6 presents implications of
our theory for related experiments in Korenok et al. (2014), Krupka and Weber (2013), Lazear,
Malmendier, and Weber (2012), Oxoby and Spraggon (2008) as well as for the classical (loss
aversion) reference-dependent model of Tversky and Kahneman (1991). Section 7 explains how
our theory can be applied to strategic games with contractions and presents applications to
moonlighting and investment games and to carrot/stick, carrot, and stick games. Section 8
concludes.

2. WHAT CAN WE LEARN ABOUT THEORY FROM DICTATOR EXPERIMENTS?
2.1 Experiments in which Behavior is Inconsistent with (Universal) Selfish Preferences
Kahneman et al. (1986) was the first to conduct a dictator game experiment in economics, giving
subjects a hypothetical choice of choosing an even split of $20 ($10 each) with an anonymous
subject or an uneven split ($18, $2), favoring themselves. Three-quarters of the subjects opted
5

Moral cost models have been suggested in previous work (e.g., Levitt and List, 2007; DellaVigna et al., 2012;
Kessler and Leider, 2012; Ferraro and Price, 2013; Krupka and Weber, 2013; Kimbrough and Vostroknutov, 2015).
However, such models incorporate moral costs as parameterizations of a utility function. Our approach differs from
this prior work by developing an axiom that extends choice theory to allow for moral reference points.
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for the equal split. The wheels were set in motion for three decades of research examining
sharing and allocation of surplus in the lab and field. One stylized result that has emerged from
the large literature is that more than 60 percent of subjects pass a positive amount to their
anonymous partners and, on average, give more than 25 percent of the total available (Engel,
2011).
Even though some scholars have argued that such giving patterns violate deeply held
economic doctrines, it is important to recall that preference order axioms do not uniquely
identify the commodity bundles. In a two-commodity case, for example, preferences may be
defined over my hotdogs and my hamburgers. But, of course, the same formal theory of
preferences can be applied to two commodities identified as my hamburgers and your
hamburgers. Identification of the commodities in a bundle is an interpretation of the theory. In
this way convex preference theory, either developed as neoclassical preference theory (Hicks,
1946; Samuelson, 1947) or revealed preference theory (Afriat, 1967; Varian, 1982) can be used
for agents who are either self-regarding (homo economicus) or other-regarding (including
preferences for equity). As such, the received results of giving in standard dictator games, while
inconsistent with homo economicus, can be accommodated by convex preference theory
(Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Fisman et al. 2007).

2.2 Experiments in which Behavior is Inconsistent with Convex Preference Theory
List (2007) and Bardsley (2008), amongst others, use laboratory dictator game experiments to
explore how choices are influenced by introducing opportunities for the dictator to take from
another subject. This line of work does present a challenge for convex preference theory, as we
now discuss.
Figure 1 shows data from List (2007) and Bardsley (2008). 6 Previous discussions of
List’s data have focused on comparing the 29% of choices of 0 in the Baseline (standard dictator
game allowing giving up to $5) treatment with the 65% of the choices of -1 or 0 in the Take 1
treatment (standard dictator game augmented to allow taking $1 from the recipient). An
implication of convexity is that these figures should be the same 7 – a pattern that the data clearly
refute. Convex preference theory also implies that the choices that are in the interior of the
6

The data for List (2007) are from the JPE online appendix.
Indifference curves representing dictator’s preferences for own payoff and recipient’s payoff that are strictly
convex to the origin imply that anyone who chooses 0 or -1 in the Take 1 treatment will choose 0 in the Baseline.
7
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feasible sets for both the Baseline and Take 1 treatments should be the same. The data are also
inconsistent with this prediction of convexity. Data from Bardsley (2008) and from the
experiment with a representative sample of Danish adult subjects reported by Cappelen et al.
(2013) are also clearly inconsistent with convex preference theory.
Popular models of social preferences, including inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt
1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000), quasi-maximin (Charness and Rabin 2002), CES (Andreoni
and Miller 2002), and egocentric altruism (Cox and Sadiraj 2007), have the same implications as
conventional convex preference theory for comparisons such as the 29% vs. 65% choices in
List’s experiment. Therefore, these models are also called into question by these dictator game
data.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE: Histograms for List and Bardsley Data]
Convexity, however, is not necessary for choice rationality, so comparisons such as the
above for the List and Bardsley data are uninformative about choice rationality. An illustration of
rational choices for non-convex preferences is shown in Figure 2. An individual with such
preferences will choose x in the give or take game with the feasible set [A, C] and the
endowment at point B. The same individual, however, will choose y (rather than B) in the give
game with feasible set [A, B] and endowment at point B.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE: Example of Choice with non-Convex Preferences]
Convexity and rationality are different concepts. Convex preference theory is a special
case of rational choice theory that imposes far stronger restrictions on observable choices.
Rational choice theory requires that choices satisfy consistency (contraction and expansion)
axioms (Samuelson, 1938; Chernoff, 1954; Arrow, 1959; Sen, 1971, 1986). With C(S) and C(T)
denoting the choice sets when the feasible sets are S and T the Contraction Consistency Axiom
(CCA, also known as Property  from Sen 1971, 1986) states: For all feasible sets S and T
CCA: [ x  C(S ) and x T  S ]  x  C(T ).
In words, any allocation x C(S) that is chosen from S is also chosen from any subset T of S
that contains x. For single-valued choice functions, CCA is a necessary and sufficient condition
for existence of a complete and transitive order (Sen, 1971).
The feasible set for the Baseline treatment in List (2007) is a contraction of the set for the
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Take 1 treatment. Therefore, by CCA, anyone choosing an amount from $0 to $5 in the Take 1
treatment should make the same choice in the Baseline treatment. In contrast to the special case
of convex preferences, rational choice theory offers no suggestions for the Baseline treatment if
one is observed to choose -$1 in the Take 1 treatment. Rational choice theory: (a) can
accommodate someone who takes in the Take 1 treatment and gives in the Baseline treatment;
but (b) cannot accommodate someone who gives different amounts in the Take 1 and Baseline
treatments.
A specific implication of rational choice theory is for each of the bars portraying fractions
of choices of $0 to $5 in the Take 1 treatment to be no higher than the corresponding bar for
choices in the Baseline. With the exception of the bar at $1.50 (corresponding to two
observations in the Take 1 treatment), the List (2007) data are consistent with rational choice
theory though not with convexity. Similarly, data from Experiment 2 conducted by Bardsley
(2008) refute convexity but are mostly consistent with rational choice theory; the bar at $1.50
(two observations) is the only inconsistency with rationality in Experiment 2.
2.3 Experiment in which Behavior is Inconsistent with Contraction Consistency Axiom
Korenok et al. (2014) report a dictator game experiment that explores the effects of changing
endowments and varying give and take actions while holding constant the feasible set of payoffs.
Figure 3 illustrates five different scenarios in the Korenok et al. experiment. In all five scenarios,
the feasible set is the same set of discrete points on the budget line shown in Figure 3. What
varies across scenarios is the initial (endowed) allocation of $20 between the dictator and the
recipient. We represent these scenarios using the numbered points on the budget line in Figure 3.
For example, in scenario 1, the dictator is endowed with $20 and the recipient with $0. In
scenario 9, the recipient is endowed with $20 and the dictator with $0. Other endowments used
in the experiment are shown at points 3, 6, and 8 on the budget line.
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE: Endowments and Choices in Korenok et al.]
CCA requires choices be invariant to changes in the endowments in the experiment: for
any two endowments, the choice set remains the same set. Let S1 ($4.05) denote the average
payoff of $4.05 to the recipient in scenario 1. Using this same notation to reflect payoffs in the
remaining scenarios, the average recipient payoffs for the five scenarios are: S1 ($4.05), S3
($5.01), S6 ($5.61), S8 ($6.59), and S9 ($6.31). The differences between these payoff figures are
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statistically significant except for the comparison of S8 with S9. The fact that average payoffs
differ across endowment treatments is inconsistent with predictions from CCA.

3. MORAL MONOTONICITY THEORY

The systemic empirical failure of standard theory with data from these simple dictator games
suggests that new theory that formalizes somewhat different empirical content is needed. A
framework that has been used to describe giving, taking, and related behaviors builds upon the
notion of moral cost (Levitt and List, 2007; List, 2007; Lazear et al., 2012; DellaVigna et al.,
2012) or concern for norm compliance (Kessler and Leider, 2012; Krupka and Weber, 2013;
Kimbrough and Vostroknutov, 2015). Using this framework, individuals are said to share with
others to avoid experiencing moral cost from failing to do so or from taking actions that are
deemed socially inappropriate. We put this approach on an axiomatic foundation that follows
from initial work by Cox and Sadiraj (2010).
There are two central features of this approach: (1) postulation of Moral Monotonicity
Axiom (MMA) that is equivalent to the traditional Contraction Consistency Axiom (CCA) when
contractions preserve the moral reference point; and (2) definition of moral reference points that
are observable features of feasible sets. We first introduce and explain MMA. Subsequently, we
develop a concept of moral reference points suggested by features of dictator games that produce
data anomalous for traditional rational choice theory.
3.1 Moral Monotonicity Axiom
The items of choice are n-vectors of amounts of money (or some other defined “good”). It is
natural to expect that choices are monotonic on moral reference points; that is, the more
favorable the moral reference point to an agent the larger the allocation to that agent chosen by
himself or another, everything else equal. Let f * be chosen from some feasible set F and let G
be a subset of F that contains it.8 Let r G and r F denote moral reference points (to be defined
below) for feasible sets G and F . If the moral reference point in G is more favorable to
individual i, and (weakly) less favorable to others, then we postulate that no choice from G
allocates individual i less than f *. Similarly, if the moral reference point in G is less favorable to
individual i, and (weakly) more favorable to others, then no choice from G allocates individual i
8

Bold font is used to denote vectors.
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more than f *. Formalizing this, for every individual

one has:

MORAL MONOTONICITY AXIOM (MMA):
a. If G  F , riG  ri F and rGi  rFi , then f *  F *  G  gi*  fi * , g*  G*
b. If G  F , riG  ri F and rGi  rFi , then f *  F *  G  gi*  fi * , g*  G*
where F* and G* are choice sets of F and G.
What are the implications of MMA for contractions that preserve moral reference points
and contain choices from the bigger set? For such subsets, MMA implies that the choice set is a
singleton9 and that conventional axioms of rationality (Sen’s 1971 Properties  and  ) are
satisfied. The modified form of Sen’s Property  (a.k.a. CCA) for sets that preserve the moral
reference point is10
PROPERTY  M : if G  F and r G  r F then F *  G  G *
For singleton choice sets, this requires f * to be the chosen allocation in any subset, G of F that
contains f *. Implications of MMA for choices is stated in the following proposition.11
PROPOSITION 1: MMA implies Property  M
Proof. See Appendix A.
Thus, for opportunity sets that preserve moral reference points, MMA suffices for choices to be
rationalizable. Implications of MMA for a variety of dictator games and for play in strategic
games with contractions are discussed in Sections 6 and 7.
3.2 Moral Reference Points
Ideas about what may constitute a moral reference point are suggested by the idiosyncratic
features of designs of (a) the Korenok et al. (2014) experiment and (b) the List (2007) and
Bardsley (2008) experiments. All of these experiments include taking as well as giving
opportunities. The Korenok et al. experiment varies the dictator’s endowment while holding
constant the minimum (at other’s maximum) payoff of each agent at 0. Their data suggest that
dependence of choices on dictator’s endowment in a way not captured by traditional theory is

9

Recall that one of the attractiveness of (strict) convex preferences is that choice sets are singletons.
For non-singleton choice sets, the analogue of Sen’s (1971) Property β is Property βM: if G  F and rG  r F then
G*  F*   implies G*  F * .

10

11

The proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix A also shows that MMA implies Property βM ..
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empirically significant.12 In contrast, the paired baseline and take treatments in each of the List
and Bardsley experiments hold constant the dictator’s endowment while varying the minimum
(at other’s maximum) payoffs. Taken together, these experiments suggest that choice behavior is
dependent on (a) the dictator’s endowment and (b) the minimum (at other’s maximum) payoffs
available in the game. We define moral reference points inspired by this experimental literature.
Our definition of moral reference point incorporates two intuitions into the theory of
choice: that my moral constraints on interacting with you in “the game” we are playing may
depend on (a) my endowed (or initial) payoff in the game and (b) the payoff each of us can
receive when the other’s payoff is maximized (a.k.a. our “minimal expectation payoffs”).
Intuition (a) reflects the idea that my moral cost from making a choice, x that benefits me at
your expense decreases with the closeness of my final payoff to my endowed (“status quo”)
payoff: my “property right.” Intuition (b) reflects the idea that my moral cost from making such a
choice x :
(i)

decreases with the (positive) difference between your final payoff ( x2 ) and your
minimal expectation payoff − how much more do I give you than the minimum
you can expect from the game; and

(ii)

increases with the (positive) difference between my final payoff ( x1 ) and my
minimal expectation payoff − how much more do I give myself than the minimum
I can expect from the game.

We now formalize these insights and present a concept of moral reference points that are
determined by observable features of feasible sets. For simplicity, we first use dictator games to
illustrate concepts but the model has more general applicability, as explained in Section 7 on
strategic games with contractions. Our many applications of MMA in this paper will all be to
two-agent (dictator and strategic) games, but the definition of moral reference point can be
extended to n-agent environments, as shown in Appendix B.
Let ( m, y ) denote an ordered pair of payoffs in which my payoff, m is that of the
dictator and your payoff, y is that of the recipient. Let the dictator’s opportunity set be a finite
set F and mo and y o be the maximum feasible payoffs for the dictator and the recipient in F,
that is
12

In the various treatments, the sum of the dictator’s and recipient’s endowments is held constant. Hence the
dependence on endowment could instead be defined on recipient’s endowment. Assumed dependence on both
endowments would be an over-determined miss-specification because they sum to a constant.
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mo  max{m : (m, y)  F} and y o  max{ y : (m, y )  F} .
The minimal expectations point, (m*, y* ) is defined by the dictator’s minimum payoff when the
recipient gets their maximum feasible payoff, y o and the recipient’s minimum payoff when the
o
dictator gets their maximum feasible payoff m , that is

m* (F)  min{m :(m, y o ) F} and y* (F)  min{y :(mo , y) F}.
Following intuitions (a) and (b), we propose as a moral reference point an ordered pair
that agrees with the minimal expectation on the second (recipient’s) payoff dimension and is a
convex combination of the minimal expectation and the initial endowment em on the first
(dictator’s) payoff dimension. Formally,

(*)

r F  ((1 q )m* (F) + q em , y* (F)),

for some q [0,1] . The weight on initial endowment may depend on a variety of things (such as
whether endowments were earned or assigned).13 In all our applications the endowments are
assigned. So,

to provide a simple, transparent way of identifying moral reference points

throughout the paper, we use q  1 2 . However, all of the analysis in this paper can be easily
replicated with any other weight q  (0,1) and such changes would have no impact on the
comparative statics underlying the empirical analysis in Sections 5 and 6.
An illustration on how to locate moral reference points is shown is Figure 4, using the
example q  1 2 , and Give, Take, and Symmetric action sets for treatments in the students
experiment (reported in Section 4). With such downward-sloping budget lines, a moral reference
point can be located by: (a) first, find the minimal expectations point, (m*, y* ) by constructing a
right triangle with the budget line as the hypotenuse and the vertical and horizontal sides below
and to the left of the budget line; (b) second, find the midpoint of the line segment joining

(m*, y* ) and e (the endowment), and (c) finally, orthogonally project the midpoint onto the line
segment joining (m*, y* ) and the most selfish point. We illustrate these steps in Figure 4 using

13

The intuition that “property rights” matter for final allocations in a dictator game is consistent with results in
Cherry et al (2002), Oxoby and Spraggon (2008) and Korenok et al. (2017). Cherry et al (2002) report that dictators
share less with the recipient when dictators earned the endowment. Oxoby and Spraggon (2008) and Korenok et al.
(2017) show that dictators share more with the recipient when the total endowment was earned by the actions of the
recipient as opposed to the dictator themselves. If q  1/2 when endowments are assigned, then q > 1/2 for dictators
earning the endowment and q < 1/2 for responders earning the total endowment.
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three dictator games as examples. When, in the Symmetric action set, the endowment is at point
B and feasible set contains discrete points on the budget line extending from A to C, the minimal
expectations point is the lower left corner of the large triangle and the moral reference point is

rS . For the Give action set with endowment at point C and the budget line extending from B to
C, the minimal expectations point is the lower left corner of the small triangle and the moral
reference point is rG . Finally, for the Take action set and endowment at point B, the budget line
extends from B to C and the minimal expectation and moral reference point are both at rT .
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE: Examples of Moral Reference Points]
3.3 MMA and WARP
In some contexts, testable implications of MMA are the same as the weak axiom of revealed
preference (WARP). Consider, for example, the dictator game experiment of Andreoni and
Miller (2002) that varied underlying budget sets and applied the generalized axiom of revealed
preference (GARP) to analyze the consistency of choices.
Figure 5 illustrates two budget sets like those that the dictator can face in the Andreoni
and Miller design. Let point a (on the horizontal axis) denote the initial endowment on the
steeper line and point b denote the initial endowment on the flatter line. Further, consider the
shaded quadrilateral that is the intersection of the opportunity sets bounded by the steeper and
flatter budget lines. Viewed through the lens of MMA, let the shaded quadrilateral set be a
feasible set with endowment at point a. The minimal expectations point is the origin (0,0) for all
three feasible sets. The moral reference points for the three feasible sets are on the horizontal
axis, halfway between 0 and the respective endowment points. The moral reference point r b for
the budget set represented by the flatter budget line is more favorable to the dictator than the
moral reference point r a for the set represented by the steeper budget line.

[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE: MMA and WARP]
Now consider two choices A and B from the original sets that violate the weak axiom of
revealed preference (WARP). Suppose that the dictator chooses A on the steeper budget line.
The quadrilateral set is a subset that contains A, and has the same moral reference point ( r a ), so
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by MMA (see Proposition 1), A is also chosen from the quadrilateral set. The main implication
of MMA here is identical to CCA. Next, suppose that B is chosen from the lower flat triangle.
MMA requires that the choice in the quadrilateral (which is also a contraction of the lower flat
triangle and contains B) allocates to the dictator less than B does, because r a is to the left of r b .
Choice of A from the quadrilateral set violates this. Thus, any pair of choices of type A and B
here that violate WARP also violate MMA..
3.4 MMA and Data from Some Dictator Games in the Literature
CCA and MMA predictions for behavior in the Korenok et al. (2014) experiment are different. In
all of their treatments, the minimal expectations point is the natural origin (because the fixed
budget line intersects both axes); therefore, changes in moral reference points in their design are
entirely determined by changes in endowment. The moral reference points defined as in
statement (*) for their several endowment treatments are shown in Figure 3 using q = ½ for ease
of illustration as endowments were assigned. As the endowments move northwest along the
budget line the moral reference points move westwards along the horizontal axis from r1 to r3 to

r6 to r8 to r9 , favoring the dictator less and less. MMA requires dictator’s choices to decrease
the amount allocated to oneself for each change in endowment from 1 to 9, while CCA or convex
preferences require the choice remain the same. Korenok et al.’s (2014) data reject CCA in favor
of MMA in three out of four comparisons (and the change from endowment 8 to 9 is
insignificant).
Turning attention back to the experiments reported by List (2007) and Bardsley (2008),
we note that while their data refute convexity they are consistent with CCA and MMA. Their
experimental designs, however, have little power for testing either CCA or MMA because the
contraction (baseline) does not contain choices of more than 40% of their subjects (who took in
the Take treatments) We next explain two new experiments we designed to test MMA directly.
4. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS AND PROTOCOLS
Following List (2007), our designs begin by introducing an action set in which the dictator can
either give to or take from the recipient’s initial endowment and compares outcomes in this
augmented game to those observed in dictator games in which the participant can only give to, or
take from, the recipient. We extend this line of inquiry by considering treatments that vary the
initial endowments but preserve the feasible set of final allocations. The crossed design, of
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varying the action sets as well as the endowments, exogenously varies moral reference points,
which allow us to identify the importance of such on observed choices. 14
4.1 Design for the Children Experiment
Figure 6 shows the three major treatment types in the experiment with children denoted
“Inequality,” “Equal,” and “Envy.” The Inequality-Give treatment represents a typical dictator
game: both the dictator and recipient have a fixed endowment of 4 units, which corresponds to
the “show-up fee” in comparable laboratory experiments. In addition, the dictator is provided a
variable endowment of 4 units (so the endowment is at point BI ) and can choose to give all,
some, or none of that amount to the recipient. In the Inequality-Take treatment, the fixed
endowment is the same as in the Inequality-Give treatment, but now the “property rights” for the
4 unit variable endowment are assigned to the recipient rather than the dictator (so the
endowment is at point AI ) but the dictator can take none, some, or all of that amount. In the
Inequality-Symmetric treatment, the endowment is at point BI and we expand the action set by
allowing the dictator to either give any amount from 0 to 4 or take any amount from 0 to 4.
Across all treatments, we restrict the choices of the dictator such that only integer amounts can
be given or taken.
[FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE: Feasible Sets for the Children Experiment]
The only difference between the Inequality treatments and the Equal and Envy treatments
is that we vary the manner in which the fixed endowment is distributed across the dictator and
the recipient; this shifts the feasible sets northwest and preserves the price of giving. Specifically,
in the Equal treatment, we move 2 from the dictator’s fixed endowment into the recipient’s fixed
endowment. In the Envy treatment, we move 4 from the dictator’s fixed endowment into the
recipient’s fixed endowment.
In both the Inequality-Give and the Inequality-Symmetric treatments, the initial
endowment of (8,4) favors the dictator and she is thus faced with an allocation decision over a
14

Our approach to identifying the importance of moral reference points shares similarity with Krupka and Weber
(2013) who test the importance of norms by comparing final allocations across a standard dictator game and what
they call the Bully treatment where the initial endowment is split amongst the dictator and recipient and the dictator
is allowed to either give to or take from the recipient. Kimbrough and Vostroknutov (2015) use an alternative
approach to identify the importance of norms on dictator behavior by eliciting individual-specific measures of normsensitivity and correlating this with observed allocations in the standard dictator game.
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budget set that crosses the 45-degree line, as in most standard dictator games: see Figure 6. In the
Equal-Give and Equal-Symmetric treatments, the initial endowment of (6,6) lies on the 45degree line. However, the treatments differ in that the feasible budget set for the Equal-Give
treatment lies on and above the 45 degree line, whereas the feasible budget set for the EqualSymmetric treatment crosses the 45 degree line. 15 In the Envy-Give and the Envy-Symmetric
treatments, the initial endowment (4,8) lies strictly above the 45-degree line and favors the
recipient. Yet, these treatments differ as the feasible budget set for the Envy-Give treatment lies
strictly above the 45-degree line, whereas the feasible budget set for the Envy-Symmetric
treatment again crosses this line.16
The nine treatments of the children design provide a test of the central properties of
MMA: monotonicity of choice in each dimension of moral reference point. Table 1, first column,
shows the moral reference points (in parentheses) for the nine treatments in the children
experiment.
4.2 Protocol for the Children Experiment
The experiment was conducted at the Chicago Heights Early Childhood Center. Children were
either brought in by parents at a designated time outside normal school hours, or participated
during school hours by being taken out of class. All children who participated were assigned the
role of the dictator, while children whose parents did not bring them in for the study played the
role of receivers and were sent their final payoff via the mail.
Each child participated in only one session of the experiment, during which he/she was
assigned to either the Inequality, Equal, or Envy treatment. Preschool-age children (ages 3 to 4)
are predominant in our sample and were randomly assigned to one of the three treatments with
equal probability. Kindergarten and 1st grade-age children (ages 5 to 7) were always assigned to
the Inequality treatment. Children encountered Give, Symmetric, or Take action sets in random
order. After the first decision was paid out, children were surprised with two additional dictator
games with the remaining two action sets (which were also paid out).
15

In this regard, our design shares a similarity with treatment 1 in Cox and Sadiraj (2012) which has dictators make
allocations over a budget set that lies on and above the 45-degree line as a means to test a defining characteristic of
models of inequality aversion.
16
Note that “inequality,” “equality” and “envy” do not apply literally in the Take treatments, since in the Take
treatments the initial endowment always favors the recipient as property rights to the variable endowment are
assigned to the recipient. Yet in all such cases, the budget set over which the dictator is selecting a final payoff is
identical to that faced in the corresponding Give treatment.
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Following prior experiments with very young children (e.g., Li et al., 2013), we used
stickers as the payoff medium. To further ensure saliency and dominance of payoffs, we first
gave the child an option to select one of two predetermined sticker sets as the payoff medium in
each dictator game.17 In order to conduct the experiment with children, we designed specialized
receptacles, as shown in Figure 7. One receptacle belonged to the dictator and the other to the
intended recipient. In each treatment, both the dictator and recipient started out with a number of
stickers that could not be moved (the fixed endowment). These stickers were housed inside of
clear boxes. The stickers available for distribution (the variable endowment) were displayed on
plates that were on top of the clear boxes.
[FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE: Experiment Setup for the Children Experiment]
Children could move stickers from plate to plate until they were satisfied with their choice. Once
the decisions were made, the stickers remaining on each plate were moved into the
corresponding boxes. At the beginning of the experiment, instructions were read aloud by the
experimenter to explain how these boxes and plates were to be used. The instructions also
included questions to ensure that children understood the game. Children received a small toy at
the end of the experiment as a “show up fee.” The toy was pre-announced in the recruitment
letter, but experimenters did not remind children of the toy prior to the start of the experiment.
Parents who brought children to the session received $10 for their time and an additional $5 for
completing a short survey while they waited. Each session lasted approximately 10-12 minutes.
4.3 Participation in the Children experiment
In total, we had 329 children participate in our first experiment. The average age of our subjects
was 5, with the majority of children (183) below the age of 5; the minimum age was 3.5 and
maximum age was 7.4 years old. In our sample, we have 50% males, 45% Hispanic, 43%
African-American, and 12% Caucasian.18 Treatments are balanced on demographics, with the
exception of the Inequality treatment, which is unbalanced on age by design, as
aforementioned.19
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Available sticker types were star or mustache, underwater or space, and cat or dog, respectively, in the first,
second, and third dictator games.
18
We do not have a race on file for two subjects. Age is missing for one subject.
19
Conducting regressions (that include experimenter fixed effects) of all treatment dummies with either gender or
race (separately for African-American, Hispanic, or White) does not yield any significant coefficients for
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4.4 Design for the Undergraduate Student Experiment
We also ran an experiment with subjects recruited from the common convenience sample of
undergraduate students. This experiment also shifted the action sets and endowments with the
aim of increasing the proportion of observations in the intersection of the Symmetric action set
with the Give and Take action sets, which would provide increased opportunity to observe
inconsistencies with CCA and MMA.
Figure 8 shows three budget lines for the students experiment labeled “Inequality,”
“Equal,” and “Envy.” The finite feasible sets include discrete points on the lines. Labeling of the
feasible sets reflects the location of the midpoints B j , j  I ,Q, E , on the lines. The Symmetric
treatments have endowment at B j and permit the dictator to give (move the allocation towards

Aj ) or take (move the allocation towards C j ). The Take treatments have endowment at B j and
permit the dictator to take (move the allocation towards C j ). The Give treatments have
endowment at C j and permit the dictator to give (move the allocation towards B j ). There are
two prominent features of this design: (a) the corresponding Take and Give treatments have the
same feasible set [ B j , C j ] ; and (b) a Symmetric treatment’s feasible set [ Aj , C j ] contains the
corresponding Take and Give feasible set [ B j , C j ] as a proper subset (a strict contraction).
[FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE: Feasible Sets for the Students Experiment]
The experimental design is 3  3: (Inequality, Equal, Envy)  (Symmetric, Take, Give).
The sum of the payoffs of dictator and recipient is the same (30) in all nine treatment cells. In the
Inequality-Give treatment (with endowment at point C I in the left panel of Figure 8): the
recipient has an endowment of 3; the dictator has an endowment of 27 and can give up to 8 to the
recipient. In the Inequality-Take treatment (with endowment at point BI in the left panel): the
recipient has an endowment of 11; the dictator has an endowment of 19 and can take up to 8
from the recipient. In the Inequality-Symmetric treatment (with endowment at point BI in the
left panel): the recipient has an endowment of 11; the dictator has an endowment of 19 and can
give up to 8 or take up to 8. The Equal and Envy treatments change the locations of the (point B
demographic characteristics. Conducting similar regressions with age at time of the test as the dependent variable for
each budget line treatment (Inequality, Equal, or Envy) does not yield significant differences by action set.
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or point C ) endowments but preserve the Give, Take, or Symmetric action sets. In the Equal
feasible set, the Symmetric and Take endowment (at point BQ in the middle panel) is 15 for the
recipient and 15 for the dictator. In the Envy feasible set, the Symmetric and Take endowment
(at point BE in the right panel) is 19 for the recipient and 11 for the dictator. 20
In the Inequality-Symmetric and Envy-Give treatments, the dictator faces an allocation
decision over a budget line that crosses the 45-degree line, as in most standard dictator games. In
the Equal-Take and Equal-Symmetric treatments, the initial endowment lies on the 45-degree
line. However, the treatments differ in that the budget line for the Equal-Take treatment lies on
and below the 45-degree line whereas the budget line for the Equal-Symmetric treatment crosses
the 45-degree line.
The nine treatments of our students design also provide a direct test of MMA:
monotonicity of choice in both dimensions of moral reference point. Table 1, third column from
the right, shows the moral reference points (in parentheses) for all nine treatments in this
experiment.
4.5 Protocol for the Undergraduate Experiment
The experiment was conducted in the laboratory of the Experimental Economics Center at
Georgia State University using students recruited from the student body at Georgia State. When
they agreed to participate, subjects knew only that they would be in an economics experiment,
but not the exact nature of the experiment. Subjects were given as much time as they wanted to
read instructions on their computer monitors. After they were finished reading, summary
instructions were projected on a screen and read aloud by an experimenter to make clear that all
subjects were given the same information about the decision task. All subjects participated in
two practice dictator decisions without payoffs to become familiar with both the underlying
allocation task and the computer interface. No information was given to subjects about others’
practice decisions. After the practice decisions were completed, subjects were informed that the
computer would randomly assign them to be active decision makers or passive recipients and
that this information would appear on their screen before the start of the first actual round of
play.
20

Note that the sum of the dictator’s and recipient’s endowments is $30 in all treatments. Thus, as noted above for
the List (2007), Bardsley (2008), and Korenok et al. (2013) experiments, it would make no sense to assume
dictator’s choices are dependent on both dictator’s and recipient’s endowments.
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Subjects were informed that there was no show-up (or non-salient participation) fee in
this experiment.21 Subjects were further informed that each active subject would make two
decisions while paired with the same recipient and that one of the two decisions would be
randomly selected for payoff once both decision rounds were completed. It was explained that
these pairings were anonymous and that participants would not know the identity of the person
with whom they were paired. A subject made decisions in Give and Take action sets for the same
(Equal or Inequality or Envy) setting; or the subject made decisions in Symmetric and Give or
Take action sets for the same setting. The order of the games each active subject faced was
independently randomly selected. Subjects were asked to complete a short survey after all
decisions were made. Once all subjects had completed the survey, they were paid individually
and in private their earnings for the chosen decision round. Subject instructions and the survey
are available online: http://excen.gsu.edu/jccox/instructions.
4.6 Participation in the Undergraduate Experiment
In total, we had 612 subjects (306 dictators) participate in the undergraduate student experiment.
None of the dictators had previous experience (as either dictator or recipient) in dictator games.
Each session lasted approximately 50 minutes and each dictator made two decisions. The actual
payoffs (from the randomly selected payoff rounds) for dictators were: $19.46 (average) with the
range $8 (minimum) to $27 (maximum).
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
5.1 Overview of Results
Table 1 reports summary statistics for both experiments. The left-most column reports the
feasible actions (Symmetric, Give, or Take) and the moral reference points for the Inequality,
Equal, and Envy endowment treatments in the children experiment. The data are largely in line
with our theory.
Beginning with the Inequality endowment treatment in the children experiment, we
observe that the moral reference points change from (6,0) to (6,4) to (4,4) as the action set is
changed from Symmetric to Give to Take. Negative monotonicity with respect to the recipient’s
21

The purpose of this design feature was to avoid the ambiguity that would follow from an experimenter not
knowing whether a dictator integrates or does not integrate positive show up fees with salient payoffs in deciding
how much to give or take. The feasible sets were constructed so that no subject in any treatment could leave the lab
with less than $3.
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moral reference dimension, r2 implies that the average dictator payoff will be lower with the
Give action than with the Symmetric action space. The average payoff of 6.67 is lower than 8.79,
as reported in the second-left column (with standard deviations in brackets). Positive
monotonicity with respect to the dictator’s moral reference dimension, r1 implies that the
average dictator payoff will be lower with the Take action than with the Give action space. We
observe exactly that result. Furthermore, the relative sizes of the average dictator payoffs in the
other six rows of the first column of Table 1 are as predicted by MMA.
The fourth column of Table 1 reports the moral reference points for all treatment cells in
the students experiment. As predicted by MMA, the observed average dictators’ payoffs in Give
are larger than in the Symmetric action sets for all three treatments (Inequality, Equal and Envy).
The differences between observed relative values of average dictators’ payoffs in Give and Take
are not as predicted by MMA for Inequality and Envy treatments.
5.2 Analysis of Data from Children Experiment
To evaluate whether moral reference points affect allocations as predicted under MMA, we pool
data from the three rounds of the children experiment to estimate two Tobit models – one that
conditions choice solely upon moral reference point, r and a second that augments this
specification to include dictator fixed effects – and estimate the models separately for three
moral reference points in the experiment. To control for potentially binding budget constraints,
we set bounds to establish a common support across games with a given r . The lower (upper)
bound in each model is the lowest (highest) possible payoff a dictator could receive in the
common support.
Under standard models of choice, the moral reference point should have no influence on
payoffs. Hence, we would expect the estimated coefficients on the indicators for the r1 and r2
dimensions of the moral reference point to be zero. In contrast, payoffs depend on the moral
reference point under MMA. Specifically, MMA predicts that dictator payoffs are (i) decreasing
in r2 and (ii) increasing in r1 . We would thus expect a positive coefficient on the r2 dimension
of the moral reference point as the indicator variable in our model captures choices where r2 is
less than a baseline level r2c . Similarly, we would expect a negative coefficient on the r1
dimension of the moral reference point as the indicator variable in our model captures choices
where r1 is less than a baseline level r1c .
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Table 2 reports Tobit estimated coefficients for dummy variables for r1 and r2
dimensions of moral reference point using the pooled, within-subjects data for the children
experiment. Results are reported with and without child fixed effects. The first two columns of
the table restrict the analysis to choices from the Inequality treatment and use r  (6,4) as the
baseline reference point. The third and fourth columns restrict the analysis to choices from the
Equal treatment and use r  (4,6)

as the baseline reference point. The final two columns

correspond to data from the Envy treatment and baseline moral reference point of r  (2,8) .
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE: TESTS FOR EFFECTS OF MORAL REFERENCE POINTS
Equal Treatments: We begin by analyzing data from the Equal treatment. Every child in this
treatment made choices for each possible action – Give, Take, and Symmetric – with the order of
these actions randomized across subjects. The feasible payoff for the dictator in both the EqualGive and Equal-Take treatments is an integer (weakly) between 2 and 6. The feasible payoff for
the dictator in the Equal-Symmetric treatment is an integer (weakly) between 2 and 10. Hence,
the budget sets for Equal-Give and Equal-Take are contractions of the budget set for EqualSymmetric but all three contain integers (weakly) between 2 and 6.
As noted in Table 1, the average payoff for the dictator across these actions are (i) 5.03 in
Equal-Give, (ii) 4.50 in Equal-Take, and (iii) 6.84 in Equal-Symmetric.

To control for

differences in the budget constraint (feasible payoffs) and test whether or not observed payoffs
are influenced by moral reference points as predicted by MMA, we run Tobit regressions of
dictator’s final payoffs that use lower and upper bounds of 2 and 6. To allow independent
variation in each dimension of the moral reference point, we use data from the Equal-Give
treatment as our baseline and include indicators for the other two treatments. 22
Results from the Tobit regression are included in Table 2 and provide evidence consistent
with MMA and the importance of both the r1 and r2 dimensions of the moral reference point on
dictator payoffs. For example, the moral reference point is less favorable to the dictator in the
22

The moral reference point is r = (4, 6) in the Equal-Give treatment. The moral reference point in the Equal-Take
treatment, r = (2, 6), differs only in the r1 dimension and the moral reference point in the Equal-Symmetric
treatment,

r = (4, 2) differs only in the r2 dimension. Hence, the indicator variables for observations where

r1 < r1c and those where r2 < r2c are equivalent to indicators for the Equal-Take and Equal-Symmetric treatments,
respectively.
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Equal-Take treatment than it is in the Equal-Give treatment. Since the feasible sets in both
treatments are identical, the standard model of choice would predict no difference in dictator
payoffs. MMA, in contrast, predicts that dictator payoffs should be lower in the Equal-Take
treatment. This is precisely what we observe in our data. As noted in the middle columns of the
table, the estimated coefficient on the indicator variable for observations where r1 < r1c is
negative and statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level both with and without child fixed
effects.
We observe similar evidence when exploring changes in the r2 dimension of the moral
reference point. The moral reference point is less favorable to the recipient in the EqualSymmetric treatment than in the Equal-Give treatment. MMA thus predicts that the recipient’s
payoff in the Equal-Symmetric treatment should be lower in Equal-Symmetric than in EqualGive. As total payoffs across treatments are held constant at 12, this implies that the dictator’s
payoff in Equal-Symmetric should be greater than those observed in Equal-Give, i.e., the
estimated coefficient on the indicator variable for observations for the Equal-Symmetric
treatment should be positive. This is again what we observe. As reported in the middle columns
of the table, the estimated coefficient for observations where r2 < r2c is positive and statistically
significant at the p < 0.01 level, both with and without child fixed effects, suggesting that
dictators keep more for themselves in the Equal-Symmetric treatment. 23
Inequality and Envy Treatments: We follow the same approach when analyzing data from the
Inequality and Envy Treatments. We observe three choices for subjects in these treatments – one
each from the Give, Take, and Symmetric action sets – and use data on dictator payoffs to
estimate a Tobit model with bounds set by the common support for dictator payoffs in the
corresponding treatment.24 As before, we estimate two variants of the model for each treatment
– one with individual fixed effects and another without such fixed effects – and include
indicators for observations from the respective Take ( r1 < r1c ) and Symmetric ( r2 < r2c ) treatments.
Data from these treatments provide further evidence consistent with the predictions of
MMA, and are at odds with the conventional model of choice. Specifically, we find that changes

As is evident from the standard errors, all of the r2 < r2c test results in Table 2 reported as significant at p<0.01 are
also significant at p<0.001 except the entry in the right-most column which is significant at p<0.002.
24
The common support for dictator payoffs across the three action spaces is (4, 8) in the Inequality treatment. We
thus set 4 as a lower bound in these models and 8 as the upper bound. The common support for dictator payoffs in
the Envy treatment is integers in [0,4] and serve to define the lower and upper bounds for the Tobit.
23
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in both dimensions of the moral reference point influence dictator payoffs. For example, the
estimated coefficient on the indicator for observations in the Take treatment – i.e., observations
where r1 < r1c – is negative and statistically significant at the p < 0.01 level for the Envy
treatment; results for the Inequality treatment are similar but less significant. The estimated
coefficients for observations in the Symmetric treatment – i.e., observations where r2 < r2c – are
positive and statistically significant at the p < 0.01 level for both the Inequality and Envy
treatments with and without child fixed effects.
Viewed in its totality, data from our children experiment are consistent with the
predictions of MMA and highlight the importance of moral reference points. This result is
buttressed by the fact that the sign on every coefficient estimate in Table 2 is consistent with the
predicted effect under MMA.
5.3 Analysis of Data from Undergraduate Student Experiment
As a second test of our theory, we rely upon a between subjects comparison utilizing data from
the undergraduate student experiment. Recall that MMA predicts that the recipient’s payoff
increases in r2 when r1 is fixed. Since the total available payoff in our experiment is fixed,
comparative statics that predict an increase in the recipient’s payoff necessarily imply a
reduction in the payoff for the dictator and vice versa. In contrast, conventional choice theory,
and any model of convex preferences, predict that changes in r2 should have no impact on final
payoffs.
To test for r2 effects, we use a between-subjects comparison across three different values
of r1 .25 By design, the r1 dimension of the moral reference point within a given treatment
(Inequality, Equal, or Envy) differs across the possible actions (Give, Take, Symmetric). Hence,
testing the effects of changing r2 while holding r1 constant requires that we compare dictator
payoffs across treatments. Since all subjects were randomly assigned to a single treatment, this
means that the corresponding tests will compare payoffs across individuals – a between subject
analysis.
25

There are five possible values of r1 in our experiment: 7, 11, 15, 19, 23. There is only one treatment (EnvySymmetric) with r1 = 7 and only one treatment (Inequality-Give) with r1 = 23. As there is no variation of r2 with
these two
effects.

r1 values we can't use data from these two treatments to directly test MMA in terms of predicted r2
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To evaluate whether the recipient’s minimal expectations point influences allocations as
predicted under MMA, we estimate two Tobit models – one that conditions choice solely upon r2
and a second that augments this model to include demographic controls for the dictator (gender,
race, GPA, religion, major, study year) – for each of the three levels of r1 in our experiment.
Each model controls for potential budget constraints (common support across games with a
given r1 ) by setting as a lower bound the lowest possible payoff a recipient could receive in the
common support and as an upper bound the highest possible payoff a recipient could receive in
the common support.
For each model, we define a baseline moral reference point (r1ci , r2ci ) and include indicator
variables that equal one for observations where either (i) r2 i > r2ci or (ii) r2 i < r2ci . This differs from
our analysis of the children data where we only observed choices for which r2 > r2c . Under
standard models, the estimated coefficient on both indicators should be zero. Under MMA, the
estimated coefficient on the indicator for r2 i < r2ci should be positive and the coefficient on the
indicator for r2 i > r2ci should be negative. Table 3 presents results for these models. The left two
columns restrict the analysis to the subset of data where r1 = 15. The middle two columns
restrict the analysis to data where r1 = 19 and the right two columns to data where r1 = 11.
TABLE 3 HERE: TESTS FOR EFFECTS OF RECIPIENT MORAL REFERENCE
DIMENSION
Data from r1  15 : There are three different treatments where the dictator’s dimension of the
moral reference point ( r1 ) is held constant at 15: Inequality-Symmetric ( r2 = 3), Equal-Take ( r2 =
7) and Envy-Give ( r2 = 11). As noted in Table 1, average payoff for the dictator across these
three treatments is decreasing in the level of r2 : 20.88 in Inequality-Symmetric, 19.83 in EqualTake, and 16.57 in Envy-Give. While such patterns are consistent with predictions of MMA,
each treatment has a distinct set of feasible payoffs, which confounds tests based on raw
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averages.26 However, as each treatment has a common support [15, 19], we can use these as
bounds in a Tobit model and thus control for differences in budget constraints across treatments.
As we observe three distinct values of r2 , we can estimate the effects of both increases
and decreases in the recipient’s dimension of the moral reference point. To do so, we set r2 = 7
and include indicator variables for observations from the Inequality-Symmetric ( r2 < r2c ) and
Envy-Give ( r2 > r2c ) treatments. Empirical results are presented in the first two columns of Table
3 and provide mixed support for the predictions of MMA. Consistent with the predictions of
MMA, the estimated coefficient on the indicator for the Envy-Give treatment is negative and
statistically significant at the p < 0.01 level. This suggests that as the moral reference point
becomes more favorable to the recipient, dictators keep less for themselves. The estimated
coefficient on the indicator for the Inequality-Symmetric treatment ( r2 < r2c ) is of the wrong sign.
As the moral reference point in this treatment is less favorable to the recipient, MMA predicts
that dictator earnings should be larger than in the baseline treatment. The estimated coefficient
on this indicator is negative, but the estimate is imprecise and not statistically significant at any
meaningful level.
Other Reference Points: We follow the same approach to analyze data for choices where the
dictator’s dimension of the moral reference point takes other values – i.e., choices where r1 = 19
and r1 = 11. To estimate the effect of changing r2 , we use data on dictator payoffs to estimate a
Tobit model with bounds set by the common support for dictator payoffs in the corresponding
treatment.27 As before, we estimate two variants of the model for each treatment – one with
demographics and another without such controls – and include an indicator variable for choices
where r2 > r2c . For choices where r1 = 19 this corresponds to estimating an indicator variable for
choices from the Equal-Give treatment and for choices where r1 = 11 this corresponds to
estimating an indicator variable for choices from the Envy-Take treatment.
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The set of feasible payoffs across the three treatments are: (i) [11, 27] in Inequality-Symmetric, (ii) [15, 23] in
Equal-Take, and [14, 19] in Envy-Give. Note that feasible (budget) sets for Equal-Take and Envy-Give are
contractions of the feasible set for Inequality-Symmetric.
27
The common support for dictator payoffs across the two treatments where r1 = 19 is integers in [19, 23]. We thus
set 19 as a lower bound in these models and 23 as the upper bound. The common support for dictator payoffs in
treatments where r1 = 11 is integers in [11, 19] and serve to define the lower and upper bounds for the Tobit.
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Data from these models provide further evidence consistent with the predictions of
MMA, and at odds with the conventional model of choice. For example, as reported in the
middle columns of Table 3, the effect of increasing the recipient’s dimension of the moral
reference point is a reduction in dictator payoffs of approximately $1.56 to $1.66 – differences
that are statistically significant at the p < 0.10 level.28 Similarly, the estimated coefficient for
observations in the Envy-Take treatment – i.e., observations where r2 > r2c given that r1 = 11 – is
negative and statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level.
Viewed in their totality, results from the undergraduate student experiment are largely
consistent with predictions of MMA, and hold when we include demographic controls.
Specifically, we find statistical support for three of the four tests of r2 effects. Interestingly, in
all such instances, our results suggest that dictators keep less for themselves as the moral
reference point becomes more favorable to the recipient. We view this as strong evidence that
moral costs matter, and a result that is consistent with prior work showing that individuals are
willing to forego potential benefits to avoid social pressures or guilt that arise when acting
“selfishly” (e.g., Della Vigna et al., 2012; Ferraro and Price, 2013).
5.4 Alternative Models
We briefly examine implications of alternative models of behavior: selfish preferences, social
preferences, reference dependence, and sharing and sorting.
Selfish Preferences: Two-thirds of the transfers are positive and four out of five of our
dictators made at least one positive transfer. Given our restriction of data analysis to common
supports across treatments, the selfish preferences model predicts changes in r1 or r2 will have
no effect. Parameter estimates for both are statistically significant, rejecting the implications of
selfish behavior.
Convex Social Preferences: All prominent models of social preferences, including
inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000), quasi-maximin
(Charness and Rabin 2002), CES (Andreoni and Miller 2002), and egocentric altruism (Cox and
Sadiraj 2007) assume convex upper contour sets. Our data reject convex preference theory, so
these social preferences models are also rejected.
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As is evident from the standard errors, the test results in Table 3 reported as significant at p<0.01 are also
significant at p<0.001.
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Reference Dependent Models. The status quo (initial endowment) is the reference point
in the classical loss-aversion reference dependent model of Tversky and Kahneman (1991). This
TK model predicts that the dictator’s final payoff allocation in the Give treatment is larger than
in the Take treatment, which is the same as our MMA prediction. This is so because in the Give
scenario all feasible allocations introduce loss on dictator’s dimension and gain on recipient’s
dimension whereas in the Take scenario, all feasible allocations offer gain for dictator’s payoff
but loss for recipient’s payoff. However, in the Symmetric and Take scenarios (in the
undergraduate students experiment) the status quo (the initial endowment) is the same, and
therefore the prediction of this model is the same as the CCA prediction. MMA predicts a larger
final allocation for the dictator in the Take scenario when choice in Symmetric is between B and
C. For the children experiment, TK model’s prediction is the same as CCA’s for the Symmetric
and Give scenarios, whereas MMA predicts a smaller final allocation for the dictator in the Give
scenario when choice in Symmetric is between A and B. In summary, the data support MMA,
not TK.
Koszegi and Rabin (2006) model of reference dependence has recently seen a surge in
applied work. Predictions of this KR model for our games are similar to standard rational choice
theory because, in deterministic settings, optimal “consumption” derived for the conventional
preferences model is the “preferred personal equilibrium” in the KR model. 29 Because our data
reject conventional theory, the KR model is also rejected.
Sharing and Sorting. Lazear et al. (2012) offer a model of sharing that depends on the
environment, where an indicator variable takes value 1 when the environment allows sorting and
0 otherwise. In all of our treatments sorting is not available (i.e., people cannot sort in or out of
participating in the games), hence implications of their model for play in our games are similar to
standard preference theory, which is rejected by our data.
To summarize, our data provide evidence at odds with standard rational choice theory.
The data are also at odds with a suite of alternative behavioral models that have been used to
explain sharing. Viewed in its totality, we thus believe our data provide compelling evidence that
observable moral reference points matter, and influence choice in a manner consistent with
MMA.
6. IMPLICATIONS OF MMA FOR OTHER TYPES OF DICTATOR GAMES
29

See Proposition 3 in Koszegi and Rabin (2006, pg.1145).
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To formalize the ways in which moral reference points may influence decision making in
dictator games, we introduced the Moral Monotonicity Axiom (MMA) and applied it to analyze
data from our experiments. Yet, MMA has broader implications for choice in a range of related
experiments including, as explained above, standard (give-only) dictator games (Andreoni and
Miller 2002), and other dictator games that compare the effects of give versus take actions on
choices (Korenok et al. 2014; Cox et al., 2016), the “bully” dictator game (Krupka and Weber
2013), dictator games with outside options (Lazear, Malmendier, and Weber 2012), and dictator
games where property rights and endowments are earned (Oxoby and Spraggon, 2008; Korenok
et al., 2017).
6.1 Give and Take: MMA vs. Warm Glow
Korenok et al. (2014) report a dictator game experiment to test the theoretical model of warm
glow developed by Korenok et al. (2013). In particular, the authors explore the effects of
changing endowments and framing actions as giving to or taking from the recipient. Korenok et
al. (2014) explain that data from their experiment is inconsistent with the predictions of their
theory which, in this instance, are the same as predictions of the conventional rational choice
model. We have explained above that their data are consistent with MMA. 30
6.2 MMA and Bully Games
MMA predicts both dictator game choices and social norms elicited by Krupka and Weber
(2013). In their experiment, the moral reference point is (5, 0) in the standard dictator game and
(2.5, 0) in the bully dictator game. Hence, MMA requires choices in the bully treatment to be
drawn from a distribution that is less favorable to the dictator than the distribution of choices in
the standard game. Therefore, we expect a higher amount allocated to the recipient and a positive
estimate of the bully treatment in an ordered logistic regression. The reported mean amounts
allocated to the recipients are $2.46 (standard) and $3.11 (bully) and the coefficient estimate for
the bully treatment is significantly positive (see their Table 2).
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MMA is also consistent with the results from the meta-analysis in Zhang and Ortmann (2014) who find that the
introduction of a take option leads to lower final payouts for the recipient. We should note however, that Dreber et
al., (2013) report aggregate data patterns across give and take versions of the dictator game that appear to be at odds
with the predictions of MMA. However, as noted in Zhang and Ortmann (2014, fn. 9) the data analysis in Dreber et
al. (2013) relies upon a normalized metric of taking or giving that codes transfers in the Take only treatment as
positive instead of negative; hence the seeming inconsistency with MMA is not actually present in the data. Further,
it is important to note that there is imbalance in key demographics such as gender and age across treatments in
Dreber et al. (2013). Since such factors potentially influence the amount a dictator is willing to share, it is not clear
how to interpret differences in the normalized amount shared with the recipient in their data.
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Moreover, the distribution of elicited norms reported in Krupka and Weber’s Table 1 are
also consistent with MMA. A paired t-test of the two distributions rejects the null hypothesis of
no effect (implied by CCA), in favor of the MMA-consistent alternative (approval of higher
allocations to recipients). Hence, both actual choices and elicited beliefs in Krupka and Weber
(2013) are consistent with MMA and highlight the importance of moral reference points.
6.3 MMA and Outside Options
Lazear et al. (2012) report an extended experimental design for dictator games that includes an
outside option that allows subjects to opt out of the dictator game. Their Experiment 1 is a
between-subjects design in which one group of subjects plays a “distribute $10” dictator game
and another group of subjects can choose an outside option, that pays the dictator $10 and the
other subject $0, or choose to play the distribute $10 dictator game. 31 The Lazear et al.
Experiment 2 is a within-subjects design including several decisions with one selected randomly
for payoff. In Decision 1, subjects play a distribute $10 dictator game. In Decision 2, subjects
can sort out of the $10 dictator game, and be paid $10 (with the other subject getting $0), or sort
in and play the distribute $10 dictator game. In other decision tasks, subjects can sort out of a $S
dictator game, and be paid $10 (with the other subject getting $0), or sort in and play the
distribute $S dictator game. Values of S varied from 10.50 to 20.32
Explaining behavior of subjects in Experiment 2 who sorted into a S > 10 dictator game
and kept more than 10 for themselves is straightforward. A more interesting behavior is that
many subjects sorted out, and were paid 10, when they could have sorted into a S > 10 dictator
game and retained more than 10 for themselves (and/or more than 0 for the other). For example,
in the S = 11 game, the outside option pays (dictator, other) payoffs (10,0) whereas Paretodominating payoffs such as (11,0), (10.50, 0.50) and (10,1) are available to a subject who sorts
into the dictator game. The reluctant/willing sharers model developed by Lazear et al. (2012) is
consistent with behavior patterns in the experiment. That model is a utility function with three
arguments: own payoff, other’s payoff, and a binary indicator variable with value 1 for the
sharing (dictator game) environment and value 0 for the non-sharing (outside option)
environment. This type of behavior is consistent with our moral monotonicity model, in which

31

In sessions run in Barcelona the pie was €10 while sessions in Berkeley used a $10 pie. The text of the paper uses
the subject decision task description as an assignment to “divide $10 (€10)” while the subject instructions use the
wording “distribute $10 (€10)”.
32
The experiment included anonymity and no-anonymity treatments.
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choosing the outside option allows the decision maker to avoid moral costs from making the
sharing decision whereas choosing to play the game involves this cost, as we now explain.
A subject has the right to choose the ordered pair of payoffs (10,0) by sorting out. This
provides a clear endowment for the two-step game that includes the option of sorting in and
paying the moral cost of making a sharing decision. Let S j denote that amount of money that
can be distributed in treatment j . Since the dictator’s sharing options include 0 and S j , the
minimal expectations point for the two-stage game is the natural origin. Hence the moral
reference point if the player sorts in is (r1, r2 ) = ( 12 10,0) . An example of choices consistent with
MMA, can be captured by maximization of u(m  r1, y  r2 ) for some increasing function u(  ).
Substituting the budget constraint m  S j  y and the moral reference point (5,0) the decision
problem for our agent becomes max y u(S j  y  5, y) . The MMA model is consistent with
behavior by an agent who chooses the (10,0) outside option rather than sorting in to play a
distribute S > 10 dictator game with feasible payoffs that Pareto-dominate (10,0) contained in its
budget set (see Appendix C for an example).
Experiment 1 in Lazear et al. (2012) is a between-subjects design in which one group of
subjects play a distribute $10 dictator game and another group of subjects can sort out of the $10
dictator game, and be paid $10, or sort in and play the distribute $10 dictator game. The extended
game with the outside option is modeled as above with the MMA model using the unambiguous
(10,0) endowment provided by the outside option. The distribute $10 dictator game without
outside options is a commonly used protocol for dictator games in which neither the dictator nor
the recipient has a clearly assigned property right. This form of dictator game protocol is widely
viewed as appropriate for research on sharing behavior but it does have an ambiguous
endowment, as explained by Hoffman et al. (1994) and Hoffman et al. (1996). 33 Experiment 1
data are consistent with predictions from the MMA model which follow from interpreting the 10
available for distribution as endowments to the dictator and recipient of (10  z, z) , with any

z > 0.
6.4 MMA and Earned Endowments

33

The exact wording in the Hoffmann et al. (1994) subject instructions is “divide $10”. The exact wording in the
Lazear, et al. subject instructions is “distribute the $10 (€10)” although the text uses the wording “divide $10 (€10)”.
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Oxoby and Spraggon (2008) report an experiment with dictator games that includes treatments in
which initial endowments are determined in a first stage. In the receiver earnings treatment, the
recipient determined the initial endowment by their performance on a test that used 20 questions
pulled from the Graduate Management Admissions Test (GMAT) or the Graduate Record
Examinations (GRE). Depending upon the number of questions answered correctly, the recipient
was provided an initial endowment of either CAN $10, CAN $20, or CAN $40. In the second
stage, the dictator decided how much of this endowment they would like to take from the
recipient. The dictator earnings treatment differed along two dimensions. First, the initial
endowment was earned by the dictator’s performance on the 20 question exam. Second, the
dictator’s decision in the second stage was to determine how much of the initial endowment they
would like to give to the recipient.
Across both versions of the game, the minimal expectations point is (0, 0). Therefore, as
in the Korenok et al. (2014) experiment, changes in moral reference points across the two
treatments are entirely determined by changes in endowment. Focusing on pairs for whom the
initial endowment is CAN $40, the moral reference point is (0,0) in the receiver-earning
treatment and (20, 0) in the dictator-earning treatment. MMA would thus predict that the amount
allocated to the recipient under the recipient earnings treatment is greater than the amount
allocated to the recipient under the dictator earnings treatment. Across all three wealth levels, the
mean amounts allocated to recipients in the receiver-earning treatment are greater than the mean
amounts allocated to recipients in the dictator-earning treatment, which is a pattern of results at
odds with CCA but consistent with the predictions of MMA.
Korenok et al. (2017) extend this line of inquiry by adding a set of survey questions
designed to elicit participants’ feelings of ownership over the initial endowments. As in Oxoby
and Spraggon (2008), treatments varied whether the initial endowment was earned by the
recipient or dictator and the subsequent framing of the task as either give to or take from the
recipient. Across all wealth levels, the mean amount allocated to the recipient under the recipient
earnings treatment was greater than the amount allocated to the recipient under the dictator
earnings treatment. Moreover, dictators felt a stronger sense of ownership over the endowment
than did recipients in the dictator earnings treatment and vice versa in the receiver earnings
treatment. Hence, both actual choices and feelings of ownership over endowments depend on
property rights and initial allocations. Such data patterns are consistent with MMA, and highlight
the importance of moral reference points.
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7. IMPLICATIONS OF MMA FOR PLAY IN GAMES WITH CONTRACTIONS
We next extend our discussion to illustrate the implications of MMA for play of strategic games
involving contractions. Games that have been studied in the previous literature include: (1) the
moonlighting game and its contraction, the investment game, (2) carrot and stick games and a
contraction in the positive domain (carrot game) as well as a contraction in the negative domain,
(stick game). Together with dictator games, these games have been widely used in the literature
to measure different aspects of social behaviors, including trust and cooperation. MMA has
different implications for play of these games than does CCA, or a stronger traditional
assumption such as convex preferences (or GARP).
7.1 Investment and Moonlighting Games
The investment game (Berg et al. 1995, and hundreds of other papers) can be constructed from
the moonlighting game (Abbink et al. 2000, and scores of other papers) by contracting the
feasible choice sets of the first and second movers.34 CCA and MMA have different implications
for such contractions and allow a way to distinguish between the two models using observed
choice.
First, we argue that, for any given positive amount received, the second mover’s (SM’s)
choice is the same in the moonlighting and investment games (with the same initial
endowments). This is the prediction of CCA as well as MMA because the reference point for the
SM opportunity sets is the same in the two games. Next, we argue that for any first mover (FM)
who sends a non-negative amount in the moonlighting game, CCA requires that he choose the
same amount to send in the investment game. MMA, in contrast, requires him to choose a larger
amount to send in the investment game. The reason for this difference is that the moral reference
point for the FM opportunity set is more favorable to the FM in the moonlighting game than in
the investment game.
An implication of the two statements is that MMA predicts more money being sent by all
FMs in the investment game than in the moonlighting game whereas CCA makes this prediction
only for FMs who take in the moonlighting game. Yet it is important to note that this latter
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In the moonlighting game (Abbink, et al. 2000), both players are endowed with the same amount of money. The
first mover (FM) can give or take money from the second mover (SM); the maximum amount that can be given is
the full endowment whereas the maximum amount that can be taken is one-half the endowment. Money given by
FM is tripled by the experimenter but money taken is not transformed. After the SM is informed of the FM’s choice,
he/she can also give or take money from the FM. Each currency unit (CU) taken costs SM 1/3 CU whereas each CU
given costs SM one CU. The investment game is a contraction in that FM and SM can only give and not take.
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“prediction” results solely from the constraint that prevents taking in the investment game, not
from implications of CCA itself.
Let e denote the endowment of each FM and each SM. The amount sent by the FM is
denoted by s. If s is positive, then it is multiplied by k >1 to obtain the amount received by the
SM. Taking is not feasible in the investment game. In the moonlighting game, if s is negative
then the multiplier is 1 to obtain the amount taken from the SM. The amount returned by the SM
is denoted by r. Returning a negative amount is not feasible in the investment game. In the
moonlighting game, when r is negative it costs the SM r/k to take r from the FM.
SM opportunity sets across the two games: Let the SM be in information set M s for
some non-negative amount s sent by the FM in the moonlighting game. The M s set contains
+



costly options for the SM but can increase/decrease FM’s monetary payoff: M s  M s È M s
where
M s+  ( e  s + r , e + ks  r ) : r  [0, ks ]
M s  (e  s + r , e + ks + r / k ) : r  [  (e  s ), 0)

Consider the SM’s choice in M s in the moonlighting game when the FM sends a non-negative
amount. Consistent with observed behavior35 (as well as Pareto efficiency), the amount returned
+
will be from M s .

What are CCA and MMA predictions for SM’s choice in the investment game, at
information set I s given the same nonnegative s? In the investment game the SM’s choices can
only increase the FM’s monetary payoff by decreasing own monetary payoff,

I s  (e  s + r,e + ks  r) : r [0,ks]
+

+

Thus I s  M s Ì M s . CCA requires the same rs  M s to be the SM’s choice in the
investment game. This is also the MMA prediction because sets M s and I s have the same moral
reference point, with coordinate e  s for the FM and e + ks / 2 for the SM.

35

In data reported by Cox, Sadiraj, and Sadiraj (2008) Only 2 out of 46 second movers who did not have money

taken from them by first movers chose

rs  Ms .

34
FM choices across the two games: In the moonlighting game, the FM can send money to
the SM or take up to one-half of the SM’s initial endowment. Any positive amount sent (s > 0) is
multiplied by k > 1. Any amount taken (s < 0) is not transformed (it is one for one). The FM
choice set is M  M + È M  where
M +  {(e  s,e + ks) : s [0,e]}
M   {(e  s,e + s) : s [e / 2,0)}

Suppose the FM’s choice in the moonlighting game is some non-negative sM . In the investment
+
game, the FM can only send money to the SM. So, I  M Ì M as the FM choice set is

I  {(e  s,e + ks) : s [0,e]}
CCA requires the non-negative amount

s M to be the FM’s choice in the investment game

when it is the choice in the moonlighting game because the feasible set in the investment game is
a contraction of the feasible set in the moonlighting game. In contrast, MMA implies that the FM
will send more in the investment game because the moral reference point, (e / 2, e) in set I is
more favorable to the SM than is the moral reference point (e / 2, e / 2) in set M .
Implications for game play: Both CCA and MMA imply that, for any positive amount
received, the SM’s choices in the moonlighting and investment games are identical. We
distinguish between two types of FMs: the ones who send in the moonlighting game and the ones
who take. For a FM who takes in the moonlighting game, by design of the two games the FM
must choose a larger amount in the investment game. For a FM who does not take in the
moonlighting game, we have shown above that CCA predicts the same amount being sent in the
two games whereas MMA predicts a larger amount being sent in the investment game.
Existing data that provide empirical support for MMA: We have analyzed data from an
investment game experiment reported in Cox (2004) and a moonlighting game experiment
reported in Cox, Sadiraj, and Sadiraj (2008). These two experiments used the same initial
endowments e  (10,10), the same multiplier k (=3) and were run by the same experimenter. Data
from these experiments are consistent with the implications of MMA and inconsistent with the
implications of CCA, as follows. We have data from 64 subjects who participated in the
investment game and 130 subjects (66 within-subjects design and 64 between-subjects design)
who participated in the moonlighting game.
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FM choices: Using only FM data with non-negative amounts sent, we find that the means
of the amounts sent are 5.97 (IG) and 4 (MG) and significantly different (t-test, p-value= 0.026. 36
Therefore, the FM data are consistent with the above implications of MMA but inconsistent with
implications of CCA.
SM choices: Estimates (standard errors in parentheses) of censored regressions for SM
choices at information sets with “FM not taking” (send  0 , N=78) are37

E(r s )  0.67*** (0.15)  s + 0.41(0.29)  s  DM  0.23(1.30)  DM
Insignificance of the coefficients for DM and s  DM , “Moon” and “Send*Moon,” are consistent
with the (same) implication of MMA and CCA, as discussed above.
Taken jointly, we conclude that differences in play across the moonlighting and
investment games are inconsistent with standard rational choice theory. Changes in the first
mover’s moral reference points across games leads to greater amounts shared in the investment
game, a finding that is consistent with the predictions of MMA.
7.2 Carrot, Stick, and Carrot/Stick Games
Andreoni, Harbaugh and Vesterlund (2003) explore the effects of rewards and punishments on
cooperation by studying behavior in three games: the carrot game that offers incentives only in
terms of rewards, the stick game that allows only for negative incentives (punishment), and the
carrot and stick (C&S) game that offers players both types of incentives. The two single
incentive games are natural contractions of the C&S game. We argue that for any given positive
amount received the SM’s predicted choice is the same in the C&S and carrot game. This is the
prediction of CCA as well as MMA and arises as the moral reference point of the SM’s
opportunity set is the same in the two games. Next, we argue that for any positive amount
received the SM’s predicted choice is less malicious in the stick game than in the C&S game
according to MMA because the moral reference point in the stick game favors the SM.
Let e = (240,0) in cents denote the endowments of the FM and the SM. The amount sent,
s by the FM is the amount received by the SM and can take values from [40, 240] in all three
games. The return, rs by the SM can be positive (carrot), negative (stick) or either (C&S game)
36

If we examine only at Send > 0, averages are 7.35 (IG) and 4.84 (MG), which are significantly different (t-test, pvalue=0.004) at conventional levels.
37
Where send > 0 (N=64): E (r s )  0.65*** (0.17)  s + 0.42( 0.36)  s  DM  0.14( 1.87)  DM
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as returning a negative amount is not feasible in the carrot game whereas returning a positive
amount is not feasible in the stick game. Despite the sign of the amount returned, the FM
receives 5 rs .
SM choices across the three games: For the amount s sent by the FM let the SM feasible
s
s
s
sets be denoted by M cs in the C&S game, M c in the carrot game and M s in the stick game
s
s
s
s
such that M cs  M c  M s . The M cs set consists of options that are all costly for the SM but can

increase or decrease FM’s monetary payoff. The sets are:

M cs  (240  s + 5r, s  r ) : r  [0, s]
M ss  (240  s + 5r, s + r ) : r  [max{(240  s ) / 5,  s},0]
Let rcs be the SM’s choice in the C&S game when the FM sends amount s. CCA and MMA
predictions for SM’s choice when the FM sends amount s are as follows:
a. Carrot game: In this game the SM’s choices can only increase the FM’s monetary payoff by
decreasing own monetary payoff. CCA requires that if the SM choice in the C&S game is
s
positive, i.e. rcs  Mc then it remains a most preferred return in the carrot game. This is also

s
s
the MMA prediction because sets M cs and M c have the same moral reference point,

 240  s as

the FM coordinate and (s /2) as the SM coordinate. Andreoni et al. (2003,

Figure 7) find larger demand for rewards in the C&S game than in the carrot game which is
inconsistent with both CCA and MMA.
b. Stick game: In this game the SM’s choices can only decrease the FM’s monetary payoff by
decreasing own monetary payoff. CCA requires that if the SM’s most preferred choice in the
s
C&S game is to reduce the FM’s monetary payoff, i.e., rcs  M s then it remains a most

preferred return in the stick game. MMA, however, predicts in the stick game a smaller
return in absolute value because the moral reference point favors the SM as its coordinate is

s (rather than s / 2 ) whereas the FM’s coordinate remains the same, (240 - s) . Andreoni et
al. (2003, Figure 6) report a result they characterize as “surprising” (pg. 898) that demand
for punishment is larger in the C&S game than in the stick game. This result is predicted by
MMA but is inconsistent with CCA.
In sum, received data from Andreoni et al. (2013) provides evidence inconsistent with standard
rational choice theory and mixed support for MMA. Importantly, however, MMA can
rationalize a data pattern that Andreoni et al. (2013) label as surprising—that the demand for
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punishment is greater in the C&S game than in the stick game. As the moral reference point for
the SM in the stick game is more favorable than in the C&S game, this is what one would expect
under MMA.
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
When faced with the opportunity to share resources with a stranger, when and why do we give?
The dictator game has emerged as a key data generator to provide researchers with a simple
approach for eliciting other-regarding preferences in a controlled setting. The game has worked
well in the sense that we now understand giving behaviors at a much deeper level. What has been
less well explored is whether received results violate the basic foundations of economic theory.
Recent dictator game experiments reveal that choices of subjects in specific pairs of
dictator games are inconsistent with convex preference theory (List, 2007; Bardsley, 2008;
Cappelen et al., 2013) and inconsistent with (more general) rational choice theory (Korenok et
al., 2014) characterized by the Contraction Consistency Axiom (CCA).

The designs of

experiments that produce the anomalous data suggest how to extend rational choice theory to
increase its empirical validity. The Korenok et al. (2014) work suggests that choices depend on
endowments in ways not captured by conventional theory. The List (2007) and Bardsley (2008)
studies suggest that choices depend on minimum and maximum feasible payoffs in ways not
captured by conventional theory.
In this spirit, we propose moral reference points and a Moral Monotonicity Axiom
(MMA) that models dependence on endowment and minimal expectations payoffs. An
implication of MMA is preservation of the contraction property of rational choice theory for
feasible sets and subsets that have the same moral reference point. The moral reference points we
propose are observable features of feasible sets, not subjective reference points that can be
adjusted ex post to fit new data. We report on two novel experiments designed to test the central
feature of the new theory: monotonicity in choice with respect to distinct dimensions of
observable moral reference points. Data from the experiments largely reject CCA in favor of
MMA.
The theory of moral monotonicity, however, has more general applicability. We explain
how it can rationalize data from other types of dictator games in the literature. We also explain
how the model has implications for play of strategic games involving contractions of feasible
sets that differ from implications of conventional theory. The model and experimental data lead
us to conclude that moral reference points play a major role in the decision to act generously.
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As a whole, these findings highlight the importance of revisiting standard models to
explore the role of moral reference points in a broader array of choice settings. In the paper, we
have provided an explanation of how the theory of moral reference points is predictive of
received findings in a range of economic games designed to elicit social and cooperative
behaviors. In this manner, we view our results as having both positive and normative import. For
empiricists and practitioners, the results herein provide an indication that moral costs can play an
important role in welfare calculations and program evaluation.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics

Inequality
Equal
Envy
a

Children Experiment
Actiona:
Dictator
Moral Ref.
Payoff
S: (6, 0)
8.79 {1.77}
G: (6, 4)
6.67 {1.10}
T: (4, 4)
6.42 {1.18}
S: (4, 2)
6.84 {1.61}
G: (4, 6)
5.03 {1.20}
T: (2, 6)
4.50 {1.37}
S: (2, 4)
5.29 {2.04}
G: (2, 8)
3.40 {1.09}
T: (0, 8)
2.82 {1.41}

Nobs
163b
164
164
88
88
88
77
77
77

Undergraduate Experiment
Actiona:
Dictator
Nobs
Moral Ref.
Payoff
G: (23, 3)
22.46 {2.96}
61
T: (19, 3)
22.81 {3.34}
81
S: (15, 3)
20.88 {4.95}
82
G: (19, 7)
20.35 {2.24}
66
T: (15, 7)
19.83 {2.88}
58
S: (11, 7)
19.06 {3.52}
62
G: (15, 11)
16.57 {1.65}
67
T: (11, 11)
16.94 {1.85}
69
S: (7, 11)
16.36 {2.55}
66

Notation for Action: S (Symmetric), G (Give), T(Take); b In the Inequality treatment, one child made only two
decisions, Give and Take treatments only. Moral Reference Points in parentheses with dictator dimension first
followed by recipient dimension; Standard deviations in brackets; Nobs is the number of observations in each
treatment (children made three decisions, students made two decisions); In all treatments, the sum of dictator and
recipient payoff is 12 in Children Experiment and 30 in Students Experiment.
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Table 2. Effects of Moral Reference Point (Children experiment; within subjects)
Dep. Var: Dictator
Payoff

r1 < r1c [-]
r2 < r2c [+]

Inequality

Equal

Envy

r  (6,4)

r  (4,6)

r  (2,8)

c

c

c

-0.345
(0.215)

-0.361**
(0.153)

-0.992**
(0.419)

-1.058***
(0.310)

-1.867***
(0.699)

-1.854***
(0.526)

3.184***
(0.307)

2.971***
(0.231)

3.438***
(0.608)

3.240***
(0.474)

2.903***
(0.925)

2.582***
(0.691)

no

yes

no

yes

no

yes

Child Fixed Effects
Observations
(Low, upper) bounds

491
(4,8)

264
(2,6)

231
(0,4)

Notes: MMA predicted sign in square brackets. Entries are Tobit estimated coefficients. Standard errors in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table 3. Effects of Recipient Moral Reference Dimension (Undergraduate Experiment; between subjects)
Dep. Var:
Dictator
Payoff

r2 < r2c [+]
r2 > r [-]
c
2

Demographics
Observations

r1 =15

r1 =19

r1 =11

-1.907

-1.653

(1.434)

(1.451)

-7.135***
(1.667)

-6.910***
(1.681)

-1.661*
(0.858)

-1.563*
(0.885)

-1.318**
(0.618)

-1.310**
(0.605)

no
207

yes
207

no
147

yes
147

no
131

yes
131

Notes: MMA predicted sign in square brackets. For r1=15 columns: r2c =7 and r2=3 in the first row and r2=11 in
the third row. For two r1=19 columns: r2c =3 and r2=7 for the third row. For two r1=11 columns: r2c =7 and
r2=11 for the third row. Entries are average marginal effects. Demographics include gender, race, GPA, religion,
major and study year. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Figure 1. Histograms using Data from List (2007) and Bardsley (2008)

Notes: In the upper panel, Baseline refers to the standard dictator game in which dictators can choose to
give $0 to $5 to the receivers. The Take $1 refers to the dictator game in which the feasible set is
augmented to allow taking $1 from the recipient. In the lower panel, the Giving Game 2 refers to a standard
dictator game in which dictators can choose to give $0 to $7 to receivers. Taking Game 2 refers to a game
that is augmented to allow taking $2 from the recipient.
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Figure 2. Example of Choices with non-Convex Preferences
Recipient's
Payoffs
A
y
B
x
C

Dictator's
Payoffs

Figure 3. Endowments, Average Choices, and Moral Reference Points for Korenok et al.
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Figure 4. Example of Moral Reference Points in Dictator Games

Figure 5. MMA and WARP for the Andreoni and Miller Experiment
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Figure 6. Children Exp. Feasible Sets: [A, B] for Give or Take, [A, C] for Symmetric

Note: This figure shows the feasible budget available for each treatment and action set. Participants in the Give or
Take action sets can choose from [A, B], while participants in the Symmetric action set can choose from [A, C].

Figure 7: Experimental Setup for Children Experiment

Note: This figure displays the experimental environment. At left, blue and red plates indicate payoffs for the dictator
and recipient. Stickers on top of the plate are variable endowment, while clearly visible stickers inside the boxes are
fixed endowment. At right, a child participates in the experiment one on one with an experimenter.

Figure 8. Students Exp. Feasible Sets: [B, C] for Give or Take, [A, C] for Symmetric

Notes: This figure portrays the feasible allocations for each treatment and action set. Participants in the Give or
Take action sets can choose from [B, C], while participants in the Symmetric action set can choose from [A, C].
Actual feasible choices are ordered pairs of integers on the line segments.
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ONLINE APPENDICES
Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1
Let f belong to both F and G . Consider any g from G * . As G and F have the same moral
*

g
f
reference point, r  r , MMA requires that gi  fi and gi  fi , i . These inequalities can be

simultaneously satisfied if and only if g = f ; i.e., f belongs to G * which concludes the proof
for Property  M . Note, though, that any choice g in G * must coincide with f , an implication
of which is G * must be a singleton. So, if the intersection of F * and G is not empty then choices
satisfy Property  M .
Appendix B. Moral Reference Point in the Presence of N Players
Endowments for n agents will typically be specified, hence are observable. Identification of
observable minimal expectations payoffs for n  2 players can proceed as follows. Let y denote
the vector of payoffs of n players. Let the feasible set be a finite set F . Let y oj be the
maximum feasible payoff for player j (  1,2, n ), that is

y oj ( F )  max{ y j | y  F }
F
The minimal expectations point, y* is defined as follows. For each player j , define player i ’s

minimal expectation payoff with respect to j as

y*Fij  min{ yi | ( y j , y oj )  F }
Let Si  {y*ijF : j  i) be the set of i ’s minimal expectation points. Naturally, player i expects her
payoff to be no smaller than the smallest element in Si ; thus

y*iF  min Si , which is the ith element

F
of the vector y* .

Appendix C. An example of MMA choices in dictator games with Outside Options
(Lazear et al. (2012) experiment)
Here we provide an example using a simple function, u(m, y )  m +  y . By sorting out, a
subject can avoid the moral cost of making the sharing decision, obtain payoff allocation (10,0),
and utility V ( out )  10 +   0. If the player sorts in then she incurs moral cost of making the
sharing decision, instantiated in the model by the moral reference point (r1 , r2 )  (5,0) and
MMA. The decision-maker’s optimization problem for the dictator game is
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max y[0,S ] u ( m  r1 , y  r2 )  max y[0, S ] ( S  y  5 + 

y) .

o
2
The optimal choice is y   / 4 and the value of sorting in is V (in )  S  5 +  2 / 4 . Comparing

it to the value of sorting out, V ( out )  10 , one has:
2
1. Any agent with (*)  < 4(15  S) prefers sorting out and realizing payoff (10,0) to

sorting in and being able to choose Pareto-dominating payoffs.
2. As S increases, inequality S  5 +  2 / 4 > 10 becomes more likely to be satisfied and
therefore the fraction of subjects sorting in increases, as observed in Experiment 2.

